I was invited to give the Msgr. William D. Steele Lecture this year at St. Mary's Seminary in the Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston. I gave the lecture on Thursday, October 18, and I am going to (try to) post it here. I hope the footnotes come out:) Makes for heavy reading, but it is an important topic. Of course, it is always good to go back to visit Houston. My sincere thanks to all the nice folks who made me feel so welcome.
The Church and the State and the shifting dynamics of public Secularity
+Daniel E. Flores, Bishop of Brownsville
1. INTRO
It would be fair to say that over the last year and a half the Catholic Church in the United States and governmental authority on a federal and state level have had a contentious series of disagreements. If we look at the most publicized disagreements, the Health and Human Services rule for implementation of universal health-care coverage, and immigration laws passed in particular states, one could say they are unrelated, and destined to be resolved in divergent ways according to the political process. Or, and I think this is the more realistic way to think, we can view the controversies as related on a deep level, and indicative of a significant cultural and social shift affecting the context within which the Church operates in the United States.
Events of some urgency requiring an authentic Christian response from the whole body of the Church frequently emerge unexpectedly. We do not usually get to choose where a challenge comes from. But as Gandalf said to Frodo after the hobbit lamented the challenges of his times: "but this does not depend on us. All that we can decide is what to do with the time that is given us." Every generation of believers is faced with this question: what shall we do with the time that is given us?
I welcome this opportunity to speak on the topic of religious liberty. I hope it will help us to think about what to do with the time that is given us.
I would like to look first at the two issues I mentioned: the HHS rule, and immigration laws. I will briefly describe the points of contention between Church and State in each. And then I will move to a discussion of the underlying the issues, and the social and now political headwinds facing us
2. The current issues
The United States Congress passed and the President signed the Health Care Act of 2010. At the time the Catholic Church in the United States, speaking through its bishops, encouraged the notion of a reform of the health care system in the United States that made coverage universal and accessible. At the time of the bill’s vote in Congress, you will recall, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops opposed passage on three principal grounds. First, it did not explicitly contain language prohibiting the use of federal funds to pay for abortion, language that was available in previous legislative initiatives such as the Hyde Amendment. Second, the bill as proposed did not have language explicit enough on what is widely known as the conscience protection clause. The language was inadequate, in the bishops’ judgment to protect Catholic and other religious institutions seeking a religious exemption for aspects of coverage that conflict with the teaching of a religious body. The bishops had in mind the likelihood that contraceptive and abortifacient drugs would be part of the proposed health care coverage mandated by the government. Third, the bishops opposed the bill because it explicitly excluded undocumented immigrants from access to health care services under the new law.
The Church's position on the bill was a principled one, based on a Catholic, and reasonable understanding of what constitutes the common good. I will say more about the common good later. For now, it is sufficient to note that the flaws were judged to be sufficiently grave so as to vitiate the good the law sought to accomplish. As you will recall, the bill passed in a contentious vote.
The US Department of Health and Human Services, some time later, began formulating the particular policy norms that would be enforced in order to fulfill the requirements of the law. What has become known as the HHS mandate requires that all health insurance plans cover women's' so-called preventive services, such as sterilization and contraceptives, including some abortifacients.
Within this universal mandate was a narrowly crafted exemption for a religious employer: A religious employer is defined as an institution whose main purpose is the inculcation of religious values, who primarily employs persons who adhere its religious tenets, and which primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets, and is a non-profit organization described in various sections of the IRS code.
The effect of this legal mandate is to exclude from the religious exemption those religious institutions whose activities do not have the aim of primarily inculcating religious values, and which do not necessarily hire persons from within the religious body, and which serve persons who are not primarily adherents to that religious faith. Take for example a Catholic hospital or university, which could easily be ruled outside the narrow definition. The same could be said for many Catholic Charities organizations. These institutions would be required the morally objectionable coverage.
The attempt at an accommodation to objections raised by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops was no accommodation at all, since it merely shifted the obligation to pay for these morally objectionable services to the insurance provider. There are two main problems with this. The cost to the provider is inevitably passed on to the consumer, in this case the religious institution, leaving such institutions in the position of subsidizing morally objectionable practices. Secondly, the so called accommodation ignores the fact that many dioceses and other ecclesiastical institutions are self-insured. We are the provider.
The whole controversy is now in the court system, since neither the Administration nor the Congress have been willing to remedy the flaw.
The second kind of case I would like to discuss has to do with interference with the mission of the Church on a state and local level. Because of the inability of the federal government to reach a political consensus concerning the reform of immigration law, state and local governments are taking it upon themselves to pass particular legislation rendering illegal many services and activities which citizens and institutions may provide to undocumented immigrants. Of particular concern are two cases, on involving the State of Alabama, the other involving the state of Arizona.
Act No. 2011-535, known as the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, was signed into law in June 2011.[1] It contains a number of provisions making it a crime to receive local public assistance without proof of proper residency status. Archbishop Thomas Rodi of the Archdiocese of Mobile issued the following statement about the law at the time of its passage:
“This new Alabama law makes it illegal for a Catholic priest to baptize, hear the confession of, celebrate the anointing of the sick with, or preach the word of God to, an undocumented immigrant. Nor can we encourage them to attend Mass or give them a ride to Mass. It is illegal to allow them to attend adult scripture study groups, or attend CCD or Sunday school classes. It is illegal for the clergy to counsel them in times of difficulty or in preparation for marriage. It is illegal for them to come to Alcoholic Anonymous meetings or other recovery groups at our churches. […] The law prohibits almost every activity of our St. Vincent de Paul chapters or Catholic Social Services, […] If it involves an undocumented immigrant, it is illegal to give the disabled person a ride to the doctor; give food or clothing or financial assistance in an emergency; allow them to shop at our thrift stores or to learn English; it is illegal to counsel a mother who has a problem pregnancy, or to help her with baby food or diapers, thus making it far more likely that she will choose abortion.”[2]
The law was challenged in court and in September, 2011, certain provisions of the law were ruled unconstitutional. This was a good turn, and the following statement was issued by the Archbishop of Mobile and the bishop of Birmingham.
"We believe that our involvement in this case was necessary and important. For the sake of our congregations, and the many people we serve, it was vital that we sought to protect our clergy, staff, and parishioners from criminal prosecution as they carry out their Christian mission. Most importantly the court enjoined a key part of the statute that made it illegal to conceal, transport, harbor, or encourage an illegal immigrant to stay in Alabama. This is the part of the law that would have criminalized many of our ministries. [...] We have been and will continue to provide food, shelter, transportation, housing, and the sacraments to all of God's children, regardless of race, class, or citizenship status."[3]
Mention could also be made of the Arizona law, widely known as SB 1070. Objections raised by the Bishops of Arizona, and the USCCB reflect the same concerns expressed by the Church in Alabama, focusing upon unwarranted limitations placed by the law upon the legitimate exercise of religious freedom.
The Bishops’ Conference filed an amicus brief before the US Supreme Court supporting challenges to SB 1070, citing a number of different reasons for opposing the Arizona immigration law. Among them, the Conference brief stated that “it is acutely interested in protecting the religious liberty of Catholic and other religious institutions. [...] The Catholic Church’s religious faith, like that of many religious denominations including those who join the Conference in this brief, requires it to offer charity--ranging from soup kitchens to homeless shelters—to all in need, whether they are present in this country legally or not. Yet S.B. 1070 and related state immigration laws have provisions that could either criminalize this charity, criminalize those who provide or even permit it, or require the institutions that provide it to engage in costly (if not impossible) monitoring of the individuals they serve, and then to exclude from that charity all those whose presence Arizona and other states would criminalize. This in itself, as well as the proliferation of fifty different laws of this kind, would unnecessarily intrude on the Church’s religious liberty.
Both the Alabama case and the Arizona case are smoldering fires so to speak, since we can expect that aspects of the laws in question will be copied in other states and thus litigated for some time to come. At least until there is a federal reform of the immigration system in this country.
Taking these different issues together, the HHS rule and state immigration laws, I now propose that we examine two vital concerns that emerge from each of them. The first is the issue of the common good, and the second is the issue of religious freedom itself. The first is a wider issue, because religious freedom is part of the common good. I shall deal with the first, first, and the second, later.
3. The Church and the Common Good
Let us look first at the immigration controversies. Put simply, as Catholics we hold it is contrary to the natural law and the common good to withhold basic human care, be it food, water, or medical or spiritual care from someone because of documentary status. All of these goods are due to persons prior to civil distinctions. The obligation to care for the hungry and the thirsty issues from human dignity, which flows from God. It does not flow from the state. Our quarrel with the state lies on this point. The state is claiming that the civil conferrals of recognition through such things as residency or citizenship papers are the basis for judging whether a hungry person should be fed. This is contrary to a reasonable assessment of what constitutes justice in human society. Further, it is contrary to the divine mandate confided to the Church. This was also the basis of the bishops’ third objection to the provisions of the national health-care law. Catholic teaching sees health care as flowing from a reading of the authentic common good, again rooted in our reading of natural law, and thus is due to a person as person, prior to any subsequent civil distinctions about citizenship.
The first two points I mentioned concerning our opposition to the health care law emerge from our reading of the human good of health care. Health care is a good due to the human person who, by virtue of the inscriptions of the natural law, is a bearer of inviolable dignity. It is a violation of that dignity to withhold, or render inaccessible, the basic care needed to prevent, heal and sustain human life. But health care does not include abortion, or measures designed to prevent conception, promote sterilization, and prevent birth. The church does not consider the conception and birth of a child to be a disease the prevention of which requires a society's resources, much less the government's active promotion.
What intrigues about how these controversies between the bishops and the civil authority have played out in recent months is the diversity of reactions to our teaching on both matters. To be blunt, liberal pundits and educators tend to think we are on to something important about human dignity when we take our principled position on care for immigrants. The more conservative pundits and educators do not. On the other hand, we hear support from conservative politicians on the HHS issue, while the liberal persuaders argue we need to give up the lost argument on artificial contraception.
These varied political and media reactions to our position should hardly surprise anyone. I simply point out that we talk about the common good in a culture where our interlocutors in public policy are engaged in a race to create a consensus about the popular good. The popular good and the common good are two different notions. The popular good can be described as the will moving unconsidered reason to judgment, while the common good is reason moving the will to a well considered good. Perceptions of the popular good can change radically fairly quickly. It just takes a good campaign. The Common good does not change radically, what it needs is a lamp-post upon which to stand. It has its own innate persuasive power. The good and the true do have a way of speaking for themselves.
The Church has a responsibility to defend the prerogatives of reason, and of opening up the perceptibility of the true and the good, and the beautiful. In some ways this theme dominates the writings of Pope Benedict 16. The Regensburg address was all about defending reason as capable of attaining to the truth. Western culture, though, has adopted a naked skepticism about the power of reason to read reality adequately well so as to inform political decisions based on a standard of justice.
The reason the popular good has replaced the common good as the focus of political discourse is that to discuss the common good you have to think reason can adjudicate reality fairly in most big issues. Justice relies on a judgment of reason. With the decline of confidence in reason, has come a collapse of political discourse about the good and the just into the single criterion of the popular will. Hence most all the effort and energy of the public discourse aims at shaping at least the perception of what the popular will might be.
The “public sphere” as Charles Taylor describes it, is the media and social matrix where the public appears to talk to itself.[4] It is currently dominated by efforts to define the good in terms of popular consensus, real or imagined. This, however, takes place in a public social context that ignores religion as a merely private concern, a context that is skeptical of reason, and is driven by the aims of molding popular perceptions of the good. This is what I mean by the shift in public secularity.
I am not overly optimistic that in this environment a reasoned discourse can be had about what public policy is or is not in keeping with the common good. Continuing controversies about the legal definition of marriage in society will soon enough retake the headlines. What we teach about the natural law, right reason, the good of the family in society may prevail against the tide that moves to redefine; it may not. The promise made that the Church would not fail in her faith was not glossed by The Lord to mean that whole civil societies would never lose their reason.
I am a Christian and a Roman Catholic, JRR Tolkien once wrote, therefore I cannot conceive of history as anything but a long series of defeats.[5] That he said this accounts for the decidedly somber depiction of events that surround the final destruction of the ring of power. Frodo fails, after all, on a personal level, while succeeding despite himself in seeing the ring to its end. There is some applicability here.
Some would counsel us not to expend the resources to defend marriage, or a proper definition of health care, or a proper appreciation of human dignity as applied to undocumented immigrants. We are told that we have lost the argument on sexual morality in civil discourse, and the anti-immigrant sentiment is too strong, so we should put our energy elsewhere.
People tell me all the time that the bishops are terrible at dealing with this media and political culture. Probably so, I respond, though maybe it would be worse if we were really good at it. I think we have to speak the language of the common good and right reason, knowing that we may never win the day in the public sphere. But we owe it to reason, and to the divine revelation that redeems it, to try our best. Chesterton's saying "if it’s worth doing, it's worth doing badly" comes to mind here. Justice may prevail, despite our failures, because a larger providence governs the world, one no one can manipulate.
4. Religious Freedom as a matter of Catholic Doctrine
At the very least, the opposition of the Church to the Health Care bill called on politicians to recognize the flaws in the legislation, and correct them; if that was not in the cards, so to speak, our fall-back position to the way health care was being crafted in civil policy was at least to insure that religious institutions be explicitly protected from having to participate in aspects of the law viewed as morally objectionable. Similarly, we would argue against immigration laws that have the effect of limiting basic human care to those recognized by the state as worthy on reasonable grounds, but at the very least we would insist that our activity as a Church be immune from having to comply with morally objectionable prohibitions and limitations to charitable activities.
This leads me back to the religious freedom issue. Broadly stated, is it just for the government to define the work of religiously organized charitable organizations to be ineligible for conscience protection simply because there aim is the service of the public at large, and not members of their own denomination? Many people work in and go to Catholic colleges, who are themselves not Catholic. The same is true of Catholic hospitals, whose founding is based on the premise that Jesus’ mandate to heal was not limited to coreligionists. To be Catholic is to be obliged in a serious way of serving anyone in need. The obligation translates into a corporate desire and impulse to be present in active and beneficial ways to the wider society. Catholic institutions, like Catholic individuals, are bound by the response Jesus gives to the legal question: Who is my neighbor? This question, which elicited from the Lord the parable of the Good Samaritan, is at the root of the Church's response to both the HHS mandate and the immigration laws surfacing at the state level.
Can the Church permit the state to coerce her institutions into formal cooperation in gravely immoral activity as a condition for her to provide services to the wider society, services which the Church considers integral to her mission and identity? By the same token, can the Church permit the state to limit her services to those in need, on grounds that feeding and clothing and teaching undocumented person can be classified by the will of the state, as a criminal activity?
Religious freedom is a phrase with variable shades of meaning depending upon whether one approaches the issue from the perspective of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, or from the perspective of the Second Vatican Council document Dignitatis Humanae. They are related, of course, but not identical perspectives.
Avery Dulles pointed out in an Oxford lecture in 2000, that Dignitatis Humanae is probably not best understood as the Church reluctantly acquiescing to what the Enlightenment had long before concluded.[6] The popular reading of the Enlightenment solution to the problem of religious strife involves the enlightened sense that nobody should be coerced into accepting a religious creed, and that the state should remain indifferent to the creedal professions of its people.
Instead, the late Cardinal argues, Dignitatis Humanae is a mature expression of Catholic doctrine that springs from a longer tradition of Catholic theological anthropology. Dulles outlines in the lecture that Karol Wojtyla and others pursued changes in the original schema of the document on religious freedom that had the effect of emphasizing the properly theological—as opposed to socio/political—foundations of the teaching. Dignitatis Humanae emphasizes that religious freedom, properly understood, is grounded in both reason and in divine revelation. The main locus of intelligibility in the document is the dignity of the moral subject: It is in accordance with their dignity as persons-that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal responsibility-that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.[7]
This teaching is rooted in things like the all-important prologue tom the second part of the Summa, wherein Saint Thomas locates the divine image in man precisely in the three-fold attribute of intellectuality, freedom of will, self-governance. We have within ourselves, Saint Thomas says, the principles of our own operation, resulting in our having within ourselves the dignity of intelligent and free self-movement.[8]
Dignitatis Humanae, speaking of civil governments in particular, states in no. 3 that "it would clearly transgress the limits set to it's power were it to presume to command or forbid acts that are religious." But it is particularly to be noted that acts that are religious includes more than acts of cultic worship. Dignitatis Humanae specifically teaches the duty of society to protect the space within a free society for the Church’s members to organize and serve in the public sphere. In addition, it comes within the meaning of religious freedom that religious communities should not be prohibited from freely undertaking to show the special value of their doctrine in what concerns the organization of society and the inspiration of the whole of human activity. Finally, the social nature of man and the very nature of religion afford the foundation of the right of men freely to hold meetings and to establish educational, cultural, charitable and social organizations, under the impulse of their own religious sense.[9]
This teaching has been defended and developed since the Council, and with particular urgency more recently as the rise of aggressive secularity opened up a new line of contention. As I have already mentioned, this aggressive secularity in the public order pushes religious adherence into the private sphere. Freedom of religion becomes identified with freedom to worship as one pleases. One could argue that the privatization of religion is a manifestation of a long cultural move toward insulated living. That World Youth Day is such an anomalous event every two or three years is the exception that proves the rule.
I refer you to a couple of references, typical of the Church’s concern over this privatization of religion. In 1995, Blessed John Paul II lamented how democratic societies of the West urge persons to keep their religious convictions private, and out of the public realm. "Does this not mean that society not only excludes the contribution of religion to it's institutional life, but also promotes a culture which re-defines man as less than what he is?"[10]
Pope Benedict frequently proposes an alternative view of secularity, one that does not relegate religious conviction to the extreme periphery of social life, but rather leaves a free space for religion to operate in the public sphere. I encourage you to read the message for world day of peace, dated Jan 1, 2011: Society too, as an expression of the person and of all his or her constitutive dimensions, must live and organize itself in a way that favors openness to transcendence. Precisely for this reason, the laws and institutions of a society cannot be shaped in such a way as to ignore the religious dimension of its citizens or to prescind completely from it. Through the democratic activity of citizens conscious of their lofty calling, those laws and institutions must adequately reflect the authentic nature of the person and support its religious dimension. Since the latter is not a creation of the state, it cannot be manipulated by the state, but must rather be acknowledged and respected by it.[11] (No 8)
Clearly, the magisterium since Dignitatis Humanae has in mind the need to insist upon the existence of a human good that is not from the state, but which must be respected by the state.
Now, briefly, let us look at religious freedom as an American experience.
5. Religious Freedom and Constitutional Law.
The US Constitution itself reflects one perspective from the Age of Enlightenment, grappling with the question of religious loyalties. Constitutional attempts at codifying religious freedom were understandably rooted in a reasonable attempt to arrive at a socio/political consensus on how to manage religious loyalties which, everyone knew, were capable of making claims on human persons that governments could not. These attempts in the United States began from a general agreement that religious influence on society was a good thing.
The American experiment in revolution and then constitutional government differed greatly from the French experience some decades later. There was a sense in the American impulse towards limited government that for it to work, peoples and intermediate institutions had to have a protected space within which to operate, cooperate, compete and contribute to the greater good of the society. Churches, associations, tea societies, guilds and so many others were thought to have a great good to contribute to the overall good of society, provided they were not excessively interfered with by a governmental authority. The founding of the republic seems to have been largely motivated by a desire to keep Caesar from controlling everything. The experience of an over-reaching monarchy led to the birth of the republic. Checks and balances and freedom of religion and press and association were all inscribed into the constitution, precisely to set the legal markers needed for a vigilant people to remain free.
The originality of the American attempt at codifying religious freedom lies in great part in the reasonable judgment that religion offers a great good to society at large, and that impeding this good is neither the right of the state, nor in the interest of the people. Western European attempts in the 19th and early 20th Century were less imbued with a sense of the benefits society at large receives from religious institutions. From the French Revolution to the Spanish Civil War we can rightly see a different historical trajectory, one that thought the severe reduction of religious influences better served the demands of reason and the common good. Not surprisingly, then, that the magisterium is warmer to an American paradigm of religious freedom in a secular civil society, than say some of the paradigms found in Western Europe. In fact, both Blessed John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI have spoken with high praise for the American ideal of religious freedom as expressed in the US constitution and through the best moments of our history.
Both Dignitatis Humanae and the First Amendment presuppose that religious conviction makes claims deeper and higher than government is capable of making, and both suppose that religious activity in a free society is a genuine good for the whole society. And, in some analogous form both the US Constitution and Dignitatis Humanae presuppose that the phrase right reason can and should have meaning in public discourse, and in discussions about the good of society. Religious adherence can and should contribute in indispensable ways to these civil discussions. Our history of civil discourse and modest progress in civil rights, for example, received great impetus from religious teaching about human dignity, and from churches and individuals willing to promote this teaching in the public sphere. This was possible because of the existence of healthy intermediate institutions that had the capacity to form people in a way not exclusively dependent on government or media sources. Analogously, opposition to abortion as a human rights issue is largely fueled by the reasonable judgments of religious people. And, there is some evidence that this is having a real effect on the public sphere.
6. A sobering prospect: Are we subversive by nature?
The issues I have here outlined are arrayed around a field where power and authority are in serious contention. Caesar, in whatever form he has taken in history, is jealous to project a claim on the whole person and the whole of society.
Claims of individual conscience and of institutional conscience come into particularly bold relief and thus in conflict with Caesar after the Christian revelation. The Gospel introduced with greater clarity what was implicit but ambiguous in wounded nature, namely that the good of the whole person is not the same as the good of the social order. On the contrary, the good of the social order is promoted only if the good of the whole of each person is protected. The good of the person includes what DH calls openness to divine revelation, and what Benedict calls human transcendence. Both amount to the same openness to a voice other than Caesar's that can demand an interior obedience superior to the voice of the recognized spokesman for the social order.
I do not say that this tensions were not there before, -- Socrates comes to mind, and so does Cicero. But, the starkness of the conflicting claims and counter-claims erupt quite clearly with the Roman insistence that the Christians, like everyone else, should pay the incense tribute to the statue of Caesar. For the Romans, it was a political-religious act. Loyalty to Caesar and his gods meant loyalty to the empire.
For the Christians it was an unacceptable coercion to profess the credo of the world: here is our only city, so make the best of it. The Christians did not believe this, so they could not do it.
Elements of analogue exist between what the first Christians encountered in the early Roman Empire, and what we are facing in the current manifestations of neo-secular hegemony. Roman officialdom never understood what the problem was, since adherence to a public policy that had as its aim the securing of public order and commerce could hardly be considered objectionable to a Roman mind. The aim of social adherence in a rambunctious empire seemed laudable, especially since it only cost a little incense to cement the public recognition of legitimate authority. The Christian body instinctively sought separation of claims about divinity from claims about social order. In this sense the distinction between Church and state arose first on the Christian side of the historical unfolding.
Some sympathetic Roman might have said to the Christians, “what is a little incense?” Just do it to promote the greater good of domestic tranquility, and believe otherwise. Such a kindly Roman would simply be initiating a refrain that would echo in what some of Thomas More’s friends would kindly suggest to him about signing the Oath of Supremacy. The answer of the First Martyrs of Rome, Thomas More, and others history neither knows nor names, though was and remains part of the inner logic of the Christian revelation. The revelation about God is, for us, also a clear revelation about man. And from this revelation, as DH teaches, the loyalty to Caesar can only reach so far into the soul. If Caesar demands what God forbids, or if Caesar forbids what God demands, then the drama and the conflict is unavoidable. The Christian must answer to God first.
That the Church has had the kind of free space I earlier described within which to operate in American society may go down as an historical anomaly. It may end sooner than we imagine. That will depend on whether we both understand and move to defend the goods that are at stake. And also upon whether the dominance of the popular good can be in some way checked by a popular appreciation for the need to protect the space within which a common good voice can still be heard.
The Romans considered the early Christians to be subversive to the public order. The relativization of loyalty to Caesar could hardly be read otherwise from within the closed orb of the world. That we will be labeled worse than subversive is not out of the question. The subversive element of the Gospel is there from the moment Jesus stood before Pilate judging the one who would be judge.
The Roman attitude only shifted when the popular will shifted, and that happened not because we won the argument, but because the witness of the Church and her preaching led to conversions. The conscience can be surprised by a subversive claim that it finds ultimately prevails because it persuades from the inside. DH binds us to that kind of open anthropology. In the end the openness of the conscience to the higher claim of truth is our only real hope. Conversion alters the dynamic of the popular will and makes space for the true common good. Thus, evangelization moves the needle, so to speak, of the national focus group.
Thus, at length, we arrive at the point where the proclamation of the Gospel itself emerges as the key. The best hope, the only hope, we have to promote and defend the common good and to sustain the prerogatives or reason and justice is the grace of the Gospel itself. I could elaborate this point much further, but I think this is enough for one night’s lecture.
[1]See: http://www.ago.state.al.us/Page-Immigration-FAQ
[2] See: http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=11252
[3] See: http://www.mobilearchdiocese.org/temp/yof.cfm; Sept 29, 2011: Statement of Archbishop Thomas J. Rodi of the Mobile Archdiocese and Bishop Robert J. Baker of the Birmingham Diocese Regarding the Alabama Immigration Law.
[4] Charles Taylor: Modern Social Imaginaries, pp 83 ff.
[5] See The Letters, no. 195. See also no. 191.
[6] 26 October, 2000, Avery Cardinal Dulles, in a lecture sponsored by the Becket Fund. Reprinted in Humanitas no. 63, 440 ff., as Karol Wojtyla y la libertad religiosa en el Vaticano II.
[7] Dignitatis Humanae, no. 2.
[8] Prologue to the Second Part: [secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.
[9] Dignitatis Humanae, no. 4.
[10] 7 dec 1995 international conference on secularism and religious freedom, Becket Fund
[11] World Day of Peace Message, 2011, no. 11.
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